Seite - 781 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Operation ‘Loyalty to Arms’ 781 However, two corps commanders, Goiginger and Scotti, had overcome the crisis. The success of the Italians on the Banjšice Plateau  – the greatest since the start of the war on the south-western front  – nevertheless came as a shock, and at almost all levels of command, the question was posed as to whether the Isonzo armies would be able to withstand another attack. The same question was also being asked by the German Su- preme Army Command. Major Wetzell changed his line of argumentation. Now, he said, the purpose was to prevent the alliance partner from ‘snapping’. Wetzell suggested forming a new army from seven German and three Austro-Hungarian divisions, to be inserted at the Isonzo and with orders to go on the offensive. General Arz, who it can be imagined was pleased with the offer of German troops, immediately proposed that an even larger army be formed, and thirteen divisions be inserted : eight German and five Austro-Hungarian. Then, an unexpected objection was raised : Emperor Karl was not against the offensive per se, but was unwilling to accept support from German troops. He wrote to Kaiser Wilhelm on the matter : ‘You will surely understand Me when I place particular em- phasis on the fact that I wish to conduct the offensive against Italy with My own troops alone. My entire army calls the war against Italy “our war”. Every officer has from his youth onwards the feeling inherited by his forefathers, the yearning in his breast, to fight against the hereditary enemy. If we were to be aided by German troops, this would be oppressive, and would dampen the enthusiasm […]. Time is pressing. With a suc- cessful attack against Italy, we can perhaps bring a rapid end to the war.’1823 Karl recommended releasing Austro-Hungarian divisions from the Eastern Front and replacing them with German ones. This was to be sufficient in order to conduct the offensive and to continue to fight against the ‘hereditary enemy’ alone. At a discussion in the German Grand Headquarters in Bad Kreuznach on 28 August, an attempt was made to find a solution. Ludendorff continued to be sceptical, but the possibility that the Austro-Hungarian front in Italy might collapse caused him to falter. And Kaiser Wilhelm now began to apply pressure directly and was naturally in an unshakeable position, since according to the agreement on the Joint Supreme War Command, he had the last word in cases when the monarchs differed in their opinion. He disagreed entirely with the proposal to release Austro-Hungarian divisions in the east and re- place them with German troops. ‘Dear friend’, he wrote, ‘in congratulating you on the bold attitude of your brave Isonzo army, which is fighting under the most difficult of conditions against a superior force, I endorse your view that there, relief can be most effectively be brought only by means of a forceful offensive.’ However, he said, the German Supreme Army Command wished to point out that Imperial and Royal di- visions in the east could not be released. A replacement would only be possible by the only operative reserve of the German Army that could be sent at short notice to the east, and this reserve was intended to fight not against Russia or Romania, but to be