Seite - 799 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

War against the USA 799 Army and, in particular, the despondency among the Italian politicians, had to be com- pensated. In this case, too, the nomination of new men at the top was intended to offer hope. Sidney Sonnino remained Foreign Minister, however. He also went through a severe crisis, as could only be expected. The balance for the two-and-a-half years of war was more than shocking, and those who had pushed for war were now being deluged with accusations. A confidante of Cadorna, the dismissed Chief of the General Staff, Angelo Gatti, a colonel, writer and journalist, noted in December 1917 : ‘The entire war was nothing other than one great lie […]. It is idiotic to regard war as a means of cleansing […]. Even worse is the extent to which the military leadership misjudged the enemy. How could Cadorna ever have lured us with the promise that in six months, we would be in Vienna ? What were our military attachés saying about the strength of the enemy ? All a dream […] all lies and illusions.’1869 Interestingly, the breakthrough battle of Kobarid, the ‘miracle of Caporetto’, damp- ened the enthusiasm of the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, for appearing on this auxiliary front in force. To him, it seemed all the more important that a joint supreme command be established for the Allies, since the war council that had been in place until then had not fulfilled the hopes that had been placed in it. The weakness of both the Italians and the French, and the fact that the Russians had become inoperative, led to these considerations being quickly developed at the Conference of Rapallo on 7 November, and the ‘Supreme War Council’ of the Allies was established. There was a further development, however, which had far greater consequences. By the end of October, the Italians had not relished the prospect of military engage- ment by the USA on Italy’s behalf. Now, they came with a cry for help. The American ambassador in Rome, Page, sent a dispatch to Washington on 27 October 1917 : ‘Alle Berichte weisen darauf hin, dass die deutsch-österreichische Offensive … sehr ernste Folgen zeitigt … Wenn es die Verhältnisse erlauben, würde es hier mit großer Erleich- terung gesehen werden und sehr wesentlich zur Hebung des Widerstandswillens beitra- gen, wenn wir Österreich den Krieg erklärten.‘1870 On 1 November, Page reported : ‘Ich habe heute Morgen Sonnino getroffen. Er bemerkte in diesem inoffiziellen Gespräch, dass eine amerikanische Kriegserklärung gegen Österreich beträchtliche Auswirkun- gen haben würde.’1871 On 2 November, Prime Minister Orlando requested that Page report ‘dass jegliche Hilfe, die wir [die USA] auftreiben könnten, einschließlich der Entsendung von Truppenkontingenten, dankbar angenommen würde’.1872 8 Novem- ber : ‘Hier gibt es eine zunehmend lebhafte Diskussion darüber, warum wir uns nicht mit Österreich im Krieg befinden.’ On the same day, 8 November, the Giornale d’Italia stated this openly, and claimed that the absence of the USA in the coalition against the House of Habsburg was weakening the Allies immeasurably. 10 November : Orlando and Sonnino again had Ambassador Page report to Washington what an enormous help it would be were the USA to declare war on Austria-Hungary, or even to send