Seite - 864 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

864 Peace Feelers in the Shadow of Brest-Litovsk not interfere in the domestic affairs of Austria. Then, however, there was also a quite unmistakeable reference to the position of the Germans : ‘Your Excellency is aware that the peace with Russia must be brought about under all circumstances, and that all eventualities are possible, with the exception of the collapse of the negotiations through the fault of the Central Powers […]. It is naturally of cardinal importance that the boundless ambitions of the German Supreme Army Command do not put the peace at risk […]. Even a separate peace between ourselves and Russia would be preferable to the eventuality of failure resulting from German demands.’2053 However, Mérey was not obliged to expose himself on this issue. Czernin followed him to Brest even before the negotiations had become substantial. Hardly had Czernin arrived in Brest when he made it clear to the German chief military negotiator, Brigadier Max Hoffmann, that Austria-Hungary would conclude a separate peace with the Bolsheviks if necessary, were Germany’s desire for annexa- tion to cause the conference to fail. Czernin’s position had been agreed with Emperor Karl. The Monarch appeared set on risking the alliance with the German Empire. In the Emperor’s view, once American troops became involved in the war in Europe, the submarines would not suffice to maintain the balance of forces. Finally, Czernin had to apply the utmost pressure in order to dissuade Karl from taking unilateral steps that were also directed against Germany. Moreover : he referred the necessity of accepting the Austro-Polish solution in order to be able to maintain a balance in relation to the German Empire, since the Germans had immediately arrived in Brest with demands for Courland and Lithuania. If Poland were also left to them, Austria-Hungary itself would also be in an inferior position compared to the German Empire, even if the war were to end in victory.2054 Czernin now found himself in an extremely curious situation. He wanted and was bound by duty to promote the relinquishment of all possible annexations, and yet at the same time to work towards the dissociation of Russian-Poland and the creation of a Pol- ish kingdom, of which it was now being said that it was to become dependent on Aus- tria-Hungary. If he did not do this, Poland would be reclaimed by the German Empire without Austria’s renunciation of annexations accelerating the negotiations. If on the other hand he did so, he risked being accused of delaying, of tactical manoeuvring and annexationism. In this regard, even the Chief of the General Staff, Arz, was concerned, and had a remarkable statement forwarded to Czernin, in which he claimed that : ‘I regard the annexation of Poland to Austria-Hungary as a sacrifice that we are making for the general situation in Central Europe ; specifically from a military perspective, the planned creation of Poland should be regarded as a weakening of Austria-Hungary.’2055 Czernin was anything but confident when it came to what would happen after a possible peace had been concluded. In a letter that was probably addressed to Tisza, he gave free rein to his pessimistic view. Peace in the east would enable the Germans to