Seite - 911 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Idea for a Final Offensive 911 Austro-Hungarian air supremacy to an end. At that time, 28 Imperial and Royal aer- oplanes had been shot down, compared to only four British losses.2192 However, there had also been an interesting change in the Central Powers’ camp. While until that point, unilateral Austro-Hungarian action had been accompanied by suspicion, rejection and barely veiled criticism on the part of the German leaders, on 15 March 1918, Hinden- burg had made it clear in a telegram that he would be grateful for an Austro-Hungarian offensive in Italy in order to make it impossible for the Allies to withdraw troops from Italy and relocate them to the west. On the following day, Arz immediately sent a dis- patch to the Chief of the German General Staff that he would attempt to fix the date of an attack in discussions with Conrad and Boroević. And on 27 March, he already gave a binding offer : ‘I have the honour of reporting to Your Excellency that I shall lead an attack against Italy with all personnel and material means at the disposal of the Impe- rial and Royal Army. The preparations for this operation will be completed by the end of May. As a result of this operation, which is intended to take us to the Adige [River], I anticipate the military collapse of Italy.’2193 Internally, Arz radiated far less optimism. He clearly held the fighting capability of the Imperial and Royal troops in such low esteem that during the preparations for the offensive, which had now been agreed and which had also been assigned an approximate date, he abandoned all plans that amounted to a decisive operation, but which appeared to be far too risky. Thus, in January 1918, Conrad had already begun to push for permission to advance southwards from the Astico and Brenta Valleys in the north with his army group, which consisted of the 10th and 11th Armies. This was aimed at driving the Italians into a crushing battle. General Krauß, who at that time was still commander of the Monte Grappa section, and who was also included in the plans, wanted to make an even wider-reaching operational advance, break through on both sides of Lake Garda and then force the Italians to fight a final, all-deciding battle in approximately the same place where Radetzky had so successfully conducted his campaign in 1848. For Arz, all these ideas were far too risky. He referred to the Piave, with the intention of crossing the river in a section to the south of the Montello area before advancing towards the Adige River.2194 The first plan to be rejected by Arz was the one proposed by Krauß. The operation from the Asiago area had the potential to bring total victory if it succeeded, but it depended on many different factors, not least on the ability to provide on time and then maintain the necessary flow of supplies to the troops. It could also be anticipated that the operation from the plateaus and against the Grappa massif would present far greater challenges to the commanders and soldiers than the operation in the Piave lowlands. In Arz’ view, only such an operation would not overstretch the capacities of the Habsburg Monarchy. However, the Chief of the General Staff was not in a position to ignore his prede- cessor, and Conrad ultimately succeeded in persuading Arz to order an attack between