Seite - 913 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Alliance of Arms 913 However, this point was to be on the Piave River, where the forces of his two armies were concentrated.2196 Waldstätten informed him that the offensive was due to begin in mid-June. Boroević took note of this. However, at the bottom of his heart, he was against an offensive. He had developed a type of trench mentality, and in the interim had become convinced that Austria-Hungary was not only no longer able to conduct an offensive, but would no longer be in a position at all to continue the war in military terms.2197 When matters had developed further, a coincidence occurred that was to Waldstät- ten’s benefit. The 11th Army (under General Count Scheuchenstuel), which was part of Army Group Conrad, and which according to Conrad’s plan was to be assigned the most important role, reported that it would not be ready to deploy its artillery before 10 July.2198 This was grist to the mill for Boroević, who wanted to be ready for action sooner. On 25 April, Boroević conveyed his plan for the offensive to the Army High Command and, in so doing, took the game surrounding the offensive in the Veneto region, which was frivolous in itself, one step further : a man who had already reported fundamental doubts regarding the fighting capability of the Imperial and Royal troops, and who on principle no longer wished to lead an offensive, demanded that if an attack were to be begun, the focus of the offensive should kindly be placed among his troops on the Piave River ! Conrad, who had possibly indeed overestimated the offensive capability of the Austro-Hungarian troops, and who since 1914 had repeatedly delivered examples of over-ambitious plans, began an embittered battle for the approval and realisation of his idea. And the Army High Command, which had provoked this nonsensical situation, now did all it could to exacerbate the dilemma even further. Here, the fact should not be ignored that for this Army High Command, this was the first time that it planned a major offensive independently, since everything that had occurred during 1917, in- cluding the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, could not be regarded as the product of plans forged by the Army High Command. Now, however, a major offensive was due to take place  – and, as it would turn out, it was to be the final one taken by Austria-Hungary. The Alliance of Arms In his operational plan of 25 April, Boroević had also not forgotten the fleet, although Vice Admiral Horthy, the new Commander of the Fleet, declined to be involved. He was just as unable to agree to effective intervention from the sea as his predecessor had been during the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo.2199 Boroević felt that Conrad’s plan was doomed to failure due to the difficulties in terrain in the Sette Comuni, while Conrad called the approach taken by Boroević ‘irrational’. While, after a serious calculation of forces, the original plan had resulted in the possibility of attacking along a front of