Seite - 914 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

914 The June Battle in Veneto between 35 and 40 kilometres, he claimed, in the interim the concept was to extend at- tack operations over a front of 300 kilometres if both Conrad’s armies and both armies under Boroević were to become active. Conrad had had 16 divisions at his disposal, and had demanded double that figure. In his calculation of forces, Boroević had assumed that he would have 14 infantry divisions and demanded 23 or 24 in order to overcome only the first phase of the offensive. Both only received a fraction of what they had asked for. In terms of artillery, it became apparent that there were enormous shortages everywhere and, not least, 20,000 more draught horses were needed.2200 A calculation made by the Army High Command of the necessary railway transportation revealed that the material that had been freed up in Russia must most urgently be delivered to the Italian front. This meant an additional 1,050 trains, which under the most favour- able conditions could be provided in 50 days, and even this would only be possible if there were no shortage of coal, and no railway strikes, and, in particular, only if there was a sweeping halt to civilian transport. Naturally, the normal supplies to the front troops would also have to be maintained. This meant that one infantry division would require on average seventy tons of food supplies, thirty tons of ammunition and thirty tons of all possible other types of armaments and commodities, and always based on the needs during positional warfare, without any particular climax in the fighting.2201 Battalions were relocated from the Tyrol region to the Isonzo River and vice versa. The hinterland resembled a seething anthill, and the increase in military transportation caused the stocks of coal to shrink further. And so, the situation was the same as it had been before and during the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo : a deployment on this scale would have to be conducted at the cost of the civilian hinterland, a hinterland for which supplies were collapsing at about the same time. Finally, the Army High Command granted itself one further capital error by ordering the troops to be sent immediately, with the additional supply goods not due to arrive until later. The reason for beginning the troop transport so early was not least the fact that in light of the mutinies in the hinterland, the soldiers were to be brought to the front as quickly as possible. However, the consequences had not been thought through : the reinforcements created a situa- tion in which the need for food at the front grew from day to day. Large quantities of food, which had already been difficult enough to provide for the offensive and transport to the front, were eaten up there instantly.2202 It was a fruitless cycle in which it was not the front, but the hinterland that threatened to collapse first. In mid-April, the only means available to the chairman of the Joint Food Commit- tee, General Ottokar Landwehr, in order to maintain the supply of the crisis regions, was to resort to the safety stockpiles  – 20 wagons of flour  – for the naval port of Pula (Pola). Even so, this was only enough to last a few days. Landwehr turned to the German Supreme Army Command with a dramatic appeal. He wanted an immediate redistribution of the Romanian grain. The Germans refused to enter into negotiations.