Seite - 924 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

924 The June Battle in Veneto be able to feed the war. At the Army High Command, it was therefore already clear on the second day of the Piave battle that only its abortion could prevent a catastrophe. 14 divisions had crossed the Piave. They fought in part in the lowlands, and in part on the mountain ridges of the Montello, over which extended air battles also then took place. The Commander of the 6th Army, Archduke Joseph, also failed in his request for reservists to be supplied for his successful troops. He wrote on this subject that : ‘On the afternoon [of 15 June], we had the highest point of the Montello under our control, yet here already, there were huge losses in transportation, and we were unable to supply the attack as planned and remained where we were ; our brave troops were forced to dig themselves in as a result of physical weakness […]. Supplies were fully hindered, since no means of transportation were available and, with great effort, I was able to transport some ammunition, although some battalions were already fighting with bare weapons […]. The Montello is littered with corpses !’2232 Indeed, there was no option but to regard the June offensive as a failure, even after just two days. Wherever it was still possible, troops began to be withdrawn. On the Montello, the retreat threatened to turn into a catastrophe. Goiginger urged the Emperor, who had joined the 6th Army on 20 June, to hold the Montello ridge, since it would be more dangerous and lead to higher losses to give up the Montello and return across the Piave than to remain there. Even so, on the same day, he was ordered to retreat  – as was everyone else. When the soldiers returned to their initial positions and prepared themselves for defensive action, they were at the end of their strength, and were understandably deeply depressed. All their efforts appeared to have been for nothing. Above all, however, it was the change that had come about that was so obvious, and which could hardly be explained : even in November 1917, they had still been able to drive the Italians out, had been superior to them and had also had the better weaponry. Now, one only had to look at the statement made by the Imperial and Royal 6th Army with regard to the ratio of forces in the air to know how great the defeat had been. The statement read : ‘With regard to the ratio of forces on both sides, the Albrecht fighting has shown be- yond doubt that superiority is on the side of our enemy […]. However, the battle for supremacy in the air depends not only on numerical superiority, but also on the techni- cal flying properties of the aeroplanes, on the quality of the personnel and the nature of the deployment […]. Since January 1918, the Army High Command has provided the 6th Army with 155 R[econnaissance] and 227 F[ighter] planes. Of these, 14 R and 16 F aeroplanes have been lost as a result of enemy action, and 101 R and 168 F aeroplanes have been lost for the main part due to inadequate training of the pilots’.2233 From a total of 382 aeroplanes, 269 had been lost  – more than two-thirds ! The accusations rained down. Almost every commander wanted it to be known that he had anticipated the failure. They had been robbed of success by indolence. Conrad was castigated, and Boroević was criticised for having no ‘grit’. The General Staff major