Seite - 947 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Army Disintegrates 947 In a similar way to Adolf von Boog, others also underwent a change of heart. Boroević, for example, who had earlier applied for the disbandment of Infantry Regiment No. 28, reported after the First Battle of the Isonzo very enthusiastically to the Military Chan- cellery how well his troops had proved themselves. He insisted on a revision of the disbandment of the Prague House Regiment and contributed considerably to Emperor Franz Joseph approving its re-establishment, for the time being in the form of a ‘Field Battalion of Infantry Regiment 28’. The Commander of the Imperial and Royal 5th Army suggested, however, that other troop bodies might also feel the same way as the Prague soldiers at that time : ‘If troops fail, that means for me [that] the commander has failed. I do not require that such commanders be deployed.’ He regarded it as a physical impossibility that troops could be overwhelmed by the Italians. ‘Such troops have to expect their disbandment, as I ordered in the northerly theatre of war.’2275 From the end of 1915 and entirely in 1916, the Army High Command received increasing complaints from German commanding generals and commanders-in-chief. General Count von Bothmer and General Marschall lamented the failure of Infantry Regiments No. 18 (‘Königgrätz’) and No. 98 (‘Hobenmauth’). They had surrendered to the Russians almost without resistance. Now it was Conrad who smoothed things over and claimed that it would be a grave error of leadership to deploy the completely overfatigued personnel. The various catastrophes could be traced back, he claimed, to failures on the part of German commanders. To deploy replacement personnel imme- diately in post-battle scenarios was a serious mistake. In response to the demand of the Germans to disband the Czechs and replace them with Imperial and Royal troops, Conrad responded curtly that this wish ‘unfortunately cannot be complied with’. The Germans subsequently deployed divisional cavalry to monitor unreliable troops, just as it had been learned from the Russians, who occasionally used Cossacks to prevent infantry from fleeing.2276 In November 1915, Army Group von Linsingen complained about the conduct of the Czechs. At Rudka in the so-called Styr bend, Landwehr Infantry Regiment No. 28 (‘Pisek’) had for the most part deserted to the Russians at the beginning of Novem- ber.2277 After that, it was again Poles and Ruthenians who were in line for criticism : it was claimed that Infantry Regiments No. 15 (‘Tarnopol’), No. 58 (‘Stanislau’) and No. 95 (‘Czortków’) had completely failed. The danger did not come from the enemy, but rather from the unreliability of one’s own troops. Conrad responded to this on 24 November 1915 : ‘According to this report, Ruthenian, Polish and Czech personnel cannot be used at all.’2278 The Germans were also unable to choose which of their ally’s troops were agreeable to them. When Conrad was addressed by Falkenhayn in Pszczyna (Pleß) on 6 November 1915 regarding the desertion of Czech soldiers, he replied irritably : ‘That is regrettable. But the army as a whole is solid, [in fact] more solid than at the beginning of the war. As a result of the common victories and suffering,