Seite - 1007 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Last Army Supreme Commander 1007 at 3 o’clock in the morning. The correction of the date took place retroactively ; it was just one of many corrected dates during these days. By naming 2 November, the fiction was to be created that it was not the Emperor but the new Army Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Kövess von Kövessháza, who had concluded the armistice. In this way, a peculiar arc was closed : at the beginning of the war, there had been the ‘engagement’ at Temes-Kubin, which had in fact never taken place. At the end of the conflict, there was an armistice, for which someone was supposedly responsible who did not even know that he was the Austro-Hungarian Army Supreme Commander. In the meantime, General von Weber had been able to act again. The Allies had handed him the official armistice document. He had been informed of the approval of its acceptance and reported as the official time of the signing 3 November 1918, at 3 p.m. Weber held his prepared, formal address : ‘The Imperial and Royal Army High Command empowered me in the early hours of the morning […]. At the same time, the Imperial and Royal Army High Command instructed the Austro-Hungarian Army to cease hostilities.’2512 Badoglio responded laconically that it had not been pos- sible for the Italian High Command to inform the Italian troops immediately about the armistice. It required 24 hours ; a corresponding clause had been attached to the treaty. The armistice did not, therefore, come into force until 4 November at 3 p.m. Weber had known about this clause since 2 November and also reported the condition to Baden, though he had not yet received a response. The General could no longer reach the Army High Command. Badoglio, however, stated that the Austro-Hungarian dele- gation should immediately accept the conditions, otherwise the negotiations would be regarded as aborted. General von Weber signed the document.2513 The Italians had demanded 24 hours in order to notify all the troops about the armi- stice. This was certainly generous. In the Balkans, for example, to which the armistice also applied, only six hours were required in order to inform the troops of the ceasefire, although the conditions were at least as adverse as in Italy. The argumentation for the necessary grace period was thus on shaky ground. The condition had been known, however, and in consideration of this the troops would certainly not have been ordered to cease hostilities before the deadlines had been negotiated and the procedure fixed. Ultimately, therefore, it is not very useful to criticise and deride the Italian approach and the emphasised victory of Vittorio Veneto. Italy had merely caught sight of and improved its chances in a completely cold-blooded way  – and the Imperial and Royal Army High Command had provided it with a lever to do so. The capture of the 400,000 soldiers reported by the Italians (it was actually 360,000)2514 and who laid down their weapons, was not due to Italy violating the treaty or  – to use a word from 1915  – be- ing ‘perfidious’. An Imperial and Royal Army High Command that was incapable of utilising a one-month preparation period or of considering in detail the preconditions and terms of an armistice, that was not in a position to fulfil the necessary technical