Seite - 378 - in The Complete Aristotle

Whenever, then, the many senses lie in the conclusion no refutation takes place unless the sophist secures as well the contradiction of the conclusion he means to prove; e.g. in the proof that ‘seeing of the blind’ is possible: for without the contradiction there was no refutation. Whenever, on the other hand, the many senses lie in the questions, there is no necessity to begin by denying the double-edged premiss: for this was not the goal of the argument but only its support. At the start, then, one should reply with regard to an ambiguity, whether of a term or of a phrase, in this manner, that ‘in one sense it is so, and in another not so’, as e.g. that ‘speaking of the silent’ is in one sense possible but in another not possible: also that in one sense ‘one should do what must needs be done’, but not in another: for ‘what must needs be’ bears a number of senses. If, however, the ambiguity escapes one, one should correct it at the end by making an addition to the question: ‘Is speaking of the silent possible?’ ‘No, but to speak of while he is silent is possible.’ Also, in cases which contain the ambiguity in their premisses, one should reply in like manner: ‘Do people-then not understand what they know? “Yes, but not those who know it in the manner described’: for it is not the same thing to say that ‘those who know cannot understand what they know’, and to say that ‘those who know something in this particular manner cannot do so’. In general, too, even though he draws his conclusion in a quite unambiguous manner, one should contend that what he has negated is not the fact which one has asserted but only its name; and that therefore there is no refutation. < div id=“section20” class=“section” title=“20”> 20 It is evident also how one should solve those refutations that depend upon the division and combination of words: for if the expression means something different when divided and when combined, as soon as one’s opponent draws his conclusion one should take the expression in the contrary way. All such expressions as the following depend upon the combination or division of the words: ‘Was X being beaten with that with which you saw him being beaten?’ and ‘Did you see him being beaten with that with which he was being beaten?’ This fallacy has also in it an element of amphiboly in the questions, but it really depends upon combination. For the meaning that depends upon the division of the words is not really a double meaning (for the expression when divided is not the same), unless also the word that is pronounced, according to its breathing, as eros and eros is a case of double meaning. (In writing, indeed, a word is the same whenever it is written of the same letters and in the same manner—and even there people nowadays put marks at the 378