Page - 52 - in Book of Full Papers - Symposium Hydro Engineering

the public were verified and understood, action plans were reviewed and a one-team, one-message environment was maintained. Since February 7, 2017, over 950 DWR staff, working about 190,000 person hours, were activated to support the EOC and ICT response and recovery activities. Communication, command and control, and operational decisions continued to be a challenge and were a priority during the first 30 days or so. These challenges were addressed by: twice-daily status briefings, daily team meetings, written daily action plans, infrastructure condition verification by physical and remote monitoring, twice daily hydrology modeling, daily meetings with cooperators and contractors, and written daily reports submitted to the DOC and SOC. 5. BALANCING RISKS AND DECISIONS 5.1 FACTORS CONSIDERED As the emergency system was being set up, the FCO Spillway was being assessed, resources were being drawn together, and critical decisions had to be made. After the initial assessment of the FCO Spillway chute damage was made, varying amounts of outflow were throttled through the FCO Spillway to determine what the impact might be on the damaged spillway. Over the next few days, varying test flows were released to assess the impact of the concrete chute failure on the ability to use the FCO Spillway to manage expected reservoir inflows. After considering a number of factors, including increasing reservoir inflows, increasing reservoir elevation, additional precipitation in the long-range forecasts, size and depth of the damaged chute area, inability to access the damage chute area, and no identified temporary repair options or protective measures available, it was decided that the FCO Spillway had to be used to manage reservoir inflows. 5.1.1 Decision Making Protocol In any emergency, responders are faced with difficult decisions with limited information, assessments, and communication. There were a number of competing factors that made real time decision-making difficult during this emergency. Facing this dynamic incident, the DWR emergency response teams, regulators, consultants, and contractors and their supporting partners had to work together in ways that had not been accomplished in the past. An unfamiliar chain of command, changing command and control structures, critical specialists in remote locations, information and data limitations, safety and security, and the size and scope of the incident were some of the challenges. First and secondary potential impacts or damage to infrastructure and risks were continuously considered and reevaluated throughout the duration of the response to ensure public safety. Some of the early policy directives included transparency and communication with regulators, partners, local officials, responders, the public, and employees. The DWR SEMS organization structure was the basis for decision-making during this incident. Daily and advance planning needed to consider response 52