Page - 118 - in The Complete Plato

EUTHYPHRO: I remember. SOCRATES: Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious. EUTHYPHRO: I will tell you, if you like. SOCRATES: I should very much like. EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them. SOCRATES: Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words. EUTHYPHRO: Of course. SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said? EUTHYPHRO: It was. SOCRATES: And well said? EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said. SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences? EUTHYPHRO: Yes, that was also said. SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum? EUTHYPHRO: True. SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by measuring? EUTHYPHRO: Very true. SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine? 118