Page - 211 - in The Complete Plato

SOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying? CALLICLES: Indeed I do. SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument? CALLICLES: By all means. (Or, ‘I am in profound earnest.’) SOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me:—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge? CALLICLES: There is. SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge? CALLICLES: I was. SOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another? CALLICLES: Certainly I was. SOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same? CALLICLES: Not the same, O man of wisdom. SOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure? CALLICLES: Certainly. SOCRATES: Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good. CALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say—does he assent to this, or not? SOCRATES: He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, at the same time? CALLICLES: What do you mean? 211