Page - 269 - in The Complete Plato

yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put on our trial. Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer. Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that some men are temperate, and yet unjust? Yes, he said; let that be admitted. And temperance is good sense? Yes. And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice? Granted. If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed? If they succeed. And you would admit the existence of goods? Yes. And is the good that which is expedient for man? Yes, indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be inexpedient, and yet I call them good. I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my business, and gently said:— When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the latter good? Certainly not the last, he replied; for I know of many things—meats, drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other things, which are inexpedient for man, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither expedient nor inexpedient for man, but only for horses; and some for oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots of a tree, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so various and 269