Page - 293 - in The Complete Plato

opposite of that to which the courageous goes; the one, for example, is ready to go to battle, and the other is not ready. And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful? I said. Honourable, he replied. And if honourable, then already admitted by us to be good; for all honourable actions we have admitted to be good. That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere. True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing? The cowards, he replied. And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant? It has certainly been acknowledged to be so, he replied. And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, and better? The admission of that, he replied, would belie our former admissions. But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and pleasanter, and nobler? That must be admitted. And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence? True, he replied. And if not base, then honourable? He admitted this. And if honourable, then good? Yes. But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the contrary, are base? He assented. And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and uninstructedness? True, he said. Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it cowardice or courage? 293