Page - 298 - in The Complete Plato

MENO: I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish. SOCRATES: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman? MENO: I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman. SOCRATES: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference? MENO: I think not. SOCRATES: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man? MENO: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different from the others. SOCRATES: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house? MENO: I did say so. SOCRATES: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without temperance and without justice? MENO: Certainly not. SOCRATES: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly order them with temperance and justice? MENO: Certainly. SOCRATES: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and justice? MENO: True. SOCRATES: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are intemperate and unjust? MENO: They cannot. SOCRATES: They must be temperate and just? MENO: Yes. 298