Page - 485 - in The Complete Plato

I mean, as I was just now saying, and as I am sure that you know, that those things which are possessed by the number three must not only be three in number, but must also be odd. Quite true. And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the opposite idea will never intrude? No. And this impress was given by the odd principle? Yes. And to the odd is opposed the even? True. Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three? No. Then three has no part in the even? None. Then the triad or number three is uneven? Very true. To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposed, and yet do not admit opposites—as, in the instance given, three, although not opposed to the even, does not any the more admit of the even, but always brings the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does not receive the odd, or fire the cold—from these examples (and there are many more of them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general conclusion, that not only opposites will not receive opposites, but also that nothing which brings the opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings, in that to which it is brought. And here let me recapitulate—for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which is the double of five, will admit the nature of the odd. The double has another opposite, and is not strictly opposed to the odd, but nevertheless rejects the odd altogether. Nor again will parts in the ratio 3:2, nor any fraction in which there is a half, nor again in which there is a third, admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to the whole: You will agree? Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that. And now, he said, let us begin again; and do not you answer my question in the words in which I ask it: let me have not the old safe answer of which I 485