Page - 662 - in The Complete Plato

SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts? THEAETETUS: That is the inference. SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole? THEAETETUS: Yes, of the all. SOCRATES: You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting? THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;—if wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature. THEAETETUS: I now think that there is no difference between a whole and all. SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all? THEAETETUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them? THEAETETUS: You are right. SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters? THEAETETUS: No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for other parts. SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form? THEAETETUS: True. SOCRATES: But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of 662