Page - 701 - in The Complete Plato

Of course it is the same. And is not ‘other’ a name given to a thing? Certainly. Whenever, then, you use the word ‘other,’ whether once or oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name? True. Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one other than the others, in repeating the word ‘other’ we speak of that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other? Quite true. Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is other than the one, in that the word ‘other’ is applied to both, will be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition is like? Yes. Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the others, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other than every thing. True. Again, the like is opposed to the unlike? Yes. And the other to the same? True again. And the one was also shown to be the same with the others? Yes. And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other than the others? Certainly. And in that it was other it was shown to be like? Yes. But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite affection to that which made it like; and this was the affection of otherness. Yes. The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the opposite of 701