Page - 718 - in The Complete Plato

Of course. And the things which are other than the one will be many; for if the things which are other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing. True. But, seeing that the things which participate in the one as a part, and in the one as a whole, are more than one, must not those very things which participate in the one be infinite in number? How so? Let us look at the matter thus:—Is it not a fact that in partaking of the one they are not one, and do not partake of the one at the very time when they are partaking of it? Clearly. They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present? Very true. And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction, must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of the one, be a multitude and not one? It must. And if we continue to look at the other side of their nature, regarded simply, and in itself, will not they, as far as we see them, be unlimited in number? Certainly. And yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the parts have a limit in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to the parts. Just so. The result to the others than the one is that the union of themselves and the one appears to create a new element in them which gives to them limitation in relation to one another; whereas in their own nature they have no limit. That is clear. Then the others than the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite, and also partake of limit. Certainly. 718