Page - 720 - in The Complete Plato

Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both of them; for the expression ‘one and the others’ includes all things. Yes, all things. Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in which both the one and the others might exist? There is nothing. Then the one and the others are never in the same? True. Then they are separated from each other? Yes. And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts? Impossible. Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor as part, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts? Impossible. Then there is no way in which the others can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part? It would seem not. Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity? There is not. Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them would be a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part. True. Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one? True. Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to one another. That is clear. 720