Page - 729 - in The Complete Plato

Such appears to be the conclusion. 2.aa. Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others? Let us determine that. Yes; let us determine that. The others must surely be; for if they, like the one, were not, we could not be now speaking of them. True. But to speak of the others implies difference—the terms ‘other’ and ‘different’ are synonymous? True. Other means other than other, and different, different from the different? Yes. Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which they will be other? Certainly. And what can that be?—for if the one is not, they will not be other than the one. They will not. Then they will be other than each other; for the only remaining alternative is that they are other than nothing. True. And they are each other than one another, as being plural and not singular; for if one is not, they cannot be singular, but every particle of them is infinite in number; and even if a person takes that which appears to be the smallest fraction, this, which seemed one, in a moment evanesces into many, as in a dream, and from being the smallest becomes very great, in comparison with the fractions into which it is split up? Very true. And in such particles the others will be other than one another, if others are, and the one is not? Exactly. And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one, but not being one, if one is not? 729