Page - 760 - in The Complete Plato

enquirer? THEAETETUS: That is a difficult question, and one not to be answered at all by a person like myself. STRANGER: There is at any rate no difficulty in seeing that the predicate ‘not-being’ is not applicable to any being. THEAETETUS: None, certainly. STRANGER: And if not to being, then not to something. THEAETETUS: Of course not. STRANGER: It is also plain, that in speaking of something we speak of being, for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all being is impossible. THEAETETUS: Impossible. STRANGER: You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must say some one thing? THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: Some in the singular (ti) you would say is the sign of one, some in the dual (tine) of two, some in the plural (tines) of many? THEAETETUS: Exactly. STRANGER: Then he who says ‘not something’ must say absolutely nothing. THEAETETUS: Most assuredly. STRANGER: And as we cannot admit that a man speaks and says nothing, he who says ‘not-being’ does not speak at all. THEAETETUS: The difficulty of the argument can no further go. STRANGER: Not yet, my friend, is the time for such a word; for there still remains of all perplexities the first and greatest, touching the very foundation of the matter. THEAETETUS: What do you mean? Do not be afraid to speak. STRANGER: To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is? THEAETETUS: Certainly. STRANGER: But can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not? THEAETETUS: Impossible. 760