Page - 770 - in The Complete Plato

the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one? THEAETETUS: Certainly. STRANGER: But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute unity? THEAETETUS: Why not? STRANGER: Because, according to right reason, that which is truly one must be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible. THEAETETUS: Certainly. STRANGER: But this indivisible, if made up of many parts, will contradict reason. THEAETETUS: I understand. STRANGER: Shall we say that being is one and a whole, because it has the attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all? THEAETETUS: That is a hard alternative to offer. STRANGER: Most true; for being, having in a certain sense the attribute of one, is yet proved not to be the same as one, and the all is therefore more than one. THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: And yet if being be not a whole, through having the attribute of unity, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, being lacks something of its own nature? THEAETETUS: Certainly. STRANGER: Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will become not-being? THEAETETUS: True. STRANGER: And, again, the all becomes more than one, for being and the whole will each have their separate nature. THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: But if the whole does not exist at all, all the previous difficulties remain the same, and there will be the further difficulty, that besides having no being, being can never have come into being. THEAETETUS: Why so? STRANGER: Because that which comes into being always comes into 770