Page - 788 - in The Complete Plato

STRANGER: And the not-great may be said to exist, equally with the great? THEAETETUS: Yes. STRANGER: And, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same category with the not-just—the one cannot be said to have any more existence than the other. THEAETETUS: True. STRANGER: The same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature of the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally be supposed to exist. THEAETETUS: Of course. STRANGER: Then, as would appear, the opposition of a part of the other, and of a part of being, to one another, is, if I may venture to say so, as truly essence as being itself, and implies not the opposite of being, but only what is other than being. THEAETETUS: Beyond question. STRANGER: What then shall we call it? THEAETETUS: Clearly, not-being; and this is the very nature for which the Sophist compelled us to search. STRANGER: And has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence as any other class? May I not say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence, and a nature of its own? Just as the great was found to be great and the beautiful beautiful, and the not-great not-great, and the not-beautiful not- beautiful, in the same manner not-being has been found to be and is not- being, and is to be reckoned one among the many classes of being. Do you, Theaetetus, still feel any doubt of this? THEAETETUS: None whatever. STRANGER: Do you observe that our scepticism has carried us beyond the range of Parmenides’ prohibition? THEAETETUS: In what? STRANGER: We have advanced to a further point, and shown him more than he forbad us to investigate. THEAETETUS: How is that? STRANGER: Why, because he says— 788