Page - 899 - in The Complete Plato

will always have a real feeling of pleasure? PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is also quite true. SOCRATES: Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure true only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real? PROTARCHUS: Yes; that is the question. SOCRATES: You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is what you think should be examined? PROTARCHUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities in other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of quality? PROTARCHUS: Clearly. SOCRATES: But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us. PROTARCHUS: Quite true. SOCRATES: And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure? PROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates. SOCRATES: And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak of a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse of rightness? PROTARCHUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined? PROTARCHUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its object, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name? PROTARCHUS: Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we? SOCRATES: And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which is not true, but false? PROTARCHUS: Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were saying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure false. 899