Page - 1360 - in The Complete Plato

Cleinias. Certainly. Athenian. When things have an accompanying charm, either the best thing in them is this very charm, or there is some rightness or utility possessed by them;—for example, I should say that eating and drinking, and the use of food in general, have an accompanying charm which we call pleasure; but that this rightness and utility is just the healthfulness of the things served up to us, which is their true rightness. Cleinias. Just so. Athenian. Thus, too, I should say that learning has a certain accompanying charm which is the pleasure; but that the right and the profitable, the good and the noble, are qualities which the truth gives to it. Cleinias. Exactly. Athenian. And so in the imitative arts—if they succeed in making likenesses, and are accompanied by pleasure, may not their works be said to have a charm? Cleinias. Yes. Athenian. But equal proportions, whether of quality or quantity, and not pleasure, speaking generally, would give them truth or rightness. Cleinias. Yes. Athenian. Then that only can be rightly judged by the standard of pleasure, which makes or furnishes no utility or truth or likeness, nor on the other hand is productive of any hurtful quality, but exists solely for the sake of the accompanying charm; and the term “pleasure” is most appropriately applied to it when these other qualities are absent. Cleinias. You are speaking of harmless pleasure, are you not? Athenian. Yes; and this I term amusement, when doing neither harm nor good in any degree worth speaking of. Cleinias. Very true. Athenian. Then, if such be our principles, we must assert that imitation is not to be judged of by pleasure and false opinion; and this is true of all equality, for the equal is not equal or the symmetrical symmetrical, because somebody thinks or likes something, but they are to be judged of by the standard of truth, and by no other whatever. Cleinias. Quite true. Athenian. Do we not regard all music as representative and imitative? 1360