Page - 1361 - in The Complete Plato

Cleinias. Certainly. Athenian. Then, when any one says that music is to be judged of by pleasure, his doctrine cannot be admitted; and if there be any music of which pleasure is the criterion, such music is not to be sought out or deemed to have any real excellence, but only that other kind of music which is an imitation of the good. Cleinias. Very true. Athenian. And those who seek for the best kind of song and music ought not to seek for that which is pleasant, but for that which is true; and the truth of imitation consists, as we were saying, in rendering the thing imitated according to quantity and quality. Cleinias. Certainly. Athenian. And every one will admit that musical compositions are all imitative and representative. Will not poets and spectators and actors all agree in this? Cleinias. They will. Athenian. Surely then he who would judge correctly must know what each composition is; for if he does not know what is the character and meaning of the piece, and what it represents, he will never discern whether the intention is true or false. Cleinias. Certainly not. Athenian. And will he who does not know what is true be able to distinguish what is good and bad? My statement is not very clear; but perhaps you will understand me better if I put the matter in another way. Cleinias. How? Athenian. There are ten thousand likenesses of objects of sight? Cleinias. Yes. Athenian. And can he who does not know what the exact object is which is imitated, ever know whether the resemblance is truthfully executed? I mean, for example, whether a statue has the proportions of a body, and the true situation of the parts; what those proportions are, and how the parts fit into one another in due order; also their colours and conformations, or whether this is all confused in the execution: do you think that any one can know about this, who does not know what the animal is which has been imitated? Cleinias. Impossible. 1361