Page - 1488 - in The Complete Plato

Athenian. The natures of commensurable and incommensurable quantities in their relation to one another. A man who is good for a thing ought to be able, when he thinks, to distinguish them; and different persons should compete with one another in asking questions, which will be a fair, better and more graceful way of passing their time than the old man’s game of draughts. Cleinias. I dare say; and these pastimes are not so very unlike a game of draughts. Athenian. And these, as I maintain, Cleinias, are the studies which our youth ought to learn, for they are innocent and not difficult; the learning of them will be an amusement, and they will benefit the state. If anyone is of another mind, let him say what he has to say. Cleinias. Certainly. Athenian. Then if these studies are such as we maintain we will include them; if not, they shall be excluded. Cleinias. Assuredly: but may we not now, Stranger, prescribe these studies as necessary, and so fill up the lacunae of our laws? Athenian. They shall be regarded as pledges which may be hereafter redeemed and removed from our state, if they do not please either us who give them, or you who accept them. Cleinias. A fair condition. Athenian. Next let us see whether we are or are not willing that the study of astronomy shall be proposed for our youth. Cleinias. Proceed. Athenian. Here occurs a strange phenomenon, which certainly cannot in any point of view be tolerated. Cleinias. To what are you referring? Athenian. Men say that we ought not to enquire into the supreme God and the nature of the universe, nor busy ourselves in searching out the causes of things, and that such enquiries are impious; whereas the very opposite is the truth. Cleinias. What do you mean? Athenian. Perhaps what I am saying may seem paradoxical, and at variance with the usual language of age. But when any one has any good and true notion which is for the advantage of the state and in every way acceptable to God, he cannot abstain from expressing it. 1488