Page - 1605 - in The Complete Plato

Cleinias. They cannot. Athenian. And what would you say of the state? If a person proves to be ignorant of the aim to which the statesman should look, ought he, in the first place, to be called a ruler at all; further, will he ever be able to preserve that of which he does not even know the aim? Cleinias. Impossible. Athenian. And therefore, if our settlement of the country is to be perfect, we ought to have some institution, which, as I was saying, will tell what is the aim of the state, and will inform us how we are to attain this, and what law or what man will advise us to that end. Any state which has no such institution is likely to be devoid of mind and sense, and in all her actions will proceed by mere chance. Cleinias. Very true. Athenian. In which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is any such guardian power to be found? Can we say? Cleinias. I am not quite certain, Stranger; but I have a suspicion that you are referring to the assembly which you just now said was to meet at night. Athenian. You understand me perfectly, Cleinias; and we must assume, as the argument iniplies, that this council possesses all virtue; and the beginning of virtue is not to make mistakes by guessing many things, but to look steadily at one thing, and on this to fix all our aims. Cleinias. Quite true. Athenian. Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray—the reason is that their legislators have such different aims; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. The tendency of others, again, is towards freedom; and some legislate with a view to two things at once—they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states; but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them which they exclusively honour, and to which they would have all things look. Cleinias. Then, Stranger, our former assertion will hold, for we were saying that laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, as we admitted, was rightly said to be virtue. Athenian. Yes. 1605