Page - 168 - in Loss and Damage from Climate Change - Concepts, Methods and Policy Options

168 E.Calliari et al. the issueof reducing emissions fromdeforestation and forest degradation (REDD) (Betzoldet al. 2012). Yet, it is not just about resources. “Issue-specificpower” canbe increasedusing “behaviouralpower”, i.e. tactics toalterperceivedor realpower structures (Habeeb 1988).TeamingupwithNGOswasoneof thestrategiesemployedbyAOSIStorec- tifypowerasymmetriesonL&D.Theotherwas topull resourcesandgain influence through coalition-buildingwith other non-Annex I groupings. The alignmentwith LDCs, theAfricanGroupand theG77+Chinawasarguablya resultofaconceptual “reshaping”of theL&Dconcept in the2000s.WhileoriginallyAOSIS’claimsonly focusedonlossesresultingfromsealevelrise(asinits1991proposal),consideration fortheresidualimpactsfromslowonseteventsasawholeandthefinancialriskasso- ciatedwith extremes (e.g.AOSIS2008)made a stronger case for other developing countries to support the cause. This is not to say that all these groupings had the samepositiononL&Dand, even less, the same ideaaboutwhatL&Dis. IfAOSIS stressedthe life-threateningdimensionofL&D,theLDCsfocusedmoreonthecon- nectionwithdevelopmentandhowL&Dcouldaffect thequalityof life, livelihoods, foodsecurity,andsocial fabricat thecommunity/household level.At thesametime, Bolivia definedL&Das lost development opportunities andpointed at the deferral ofpayments tointernational institutions,debtreliefandsimilarmeasuresasawayto addressthem(UNFCCC2012a).However,commondenominatorslaidintherequest forL&Dtobeastand-alonepillar inUNFCCCarchitectureand in theneedforsup- porting developing countries’ limited capacity to address climate change impacts. TheG77+Chinaisworthyofseparateconsideration.While itspositionwasdecisive fortheestablishmentoftheWIMandthecreationofaseparatearticleonL&Dinthe ParisAgreement(see,forinstance,theworkdonewithintheAdHocWorkingGroup ontheDurbanPlatformforEnhancedAction—ADP),futurealignmentwithAOSIS’ positionscannotbetakenforgranted.This ismainlybecauseof theheterogeneityof thegroupwhichmakessynthesisamongitsmembers’positionschallengingtoreach. Recentexamplesofdifficulties infindingcommonground include the reviewof the WIMatCOP22(Calliari2016b)and thequarrelsbetweenChinaandAOSISon the need (supported by the former) to erase the reference to “particularly” vulnerable developingcountries indefiningbeneficiariesofL&Dsupport.8 WhileAOSIShassurelybenefittedfromliaisingwithotherdevelopingcountries inbringingL&DhighontheUNFCCCAgenda,thiscannotdeterministicallyexplain whyoutcomesonL&Dwereobtained.Coalition-buildinginitselfisnotasuremeans for anygrouping to impact substantively onnegotiations (Cooper andShaw2009) and even less in a consensus-based setting such as the UNFCCC (Deitelhoff and Wallbott 2012). As the institutional context does not level power asymmetries—- for instance throughaone state-onevote system—weakerPartieswill beunable to succeedbyrelyingon their resource-endowmentonly.Thus, trying toexplainL&D negotiations through“realist eyes”doesnot allowforgoingbeyond the“structural- ist paradox”. It is thereforeworth investigating other sources of power beyond the neorealist perspective to getmore insight onhowAOSIS’ outcomesonL&Dwere obtained. 8PersonalobservationsatCOP22.