Page - 105 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

Cyberneuroethics • 105 such an outcome was presented by the American author Matthew Anderson in his 2002 science-fiction novel Feed, which depicts some of the forms of discrimination and limitations that may exist for those who do not have the latest versions of neuronal interfaces.12 In response to this form of the fairness argument, it has been suggested that inequality is not necessarily always detrimental to society, since a mea- sure of unfairness may actually give rise to some advantages, such as a sense of competitiveness. In short, a certain measure of inequality should not always be the basis for alarm.13 Yet, in pleading for an acceptable disparity, this proposal may mean limiting certain neuronal interfaces, which should be available for all, to only a few privileged individuals, which would no longer be seen as beneficent. Another response to this form of fairness argument recognises that human- ity is already divided. For example, people are already categorised on the basis of whether they are infected with HIV/AIDS or whether they have clean drinking water. But it is difficult to imagine a compassionate and rational person objecting to providing help for the sick unless a treatment were avail- able to all who needed it. For instance, if a cure for HIV/AIDS became avail- able, with enough doses for only 10 per cent of the over 30 million people with the disease, only very few (if any) would object to distributing this treatment to only this 10 per cent of patients. In other words, even though an action may seem unfair, it may still help some individuals. By this reason- ing, the fairness argument is weakened because aiding individuals through neuronal interfaces is preferable to not helping anyone. The increasing costs of producing new neuronal interfaces may also exac- erbate the differences between individuals who can afford to acquire advan- tages in a competitive environment and those who are too poor to afford them. But, as already indicated, this situation is not new, since the wealthy already have a number of real advantages. Yet, a lot depends on the rest of the assumed social and political contexts. This means that the introduction of neuronal interfaces into a society may only be of concern if it did not already have procedures in place seeking to redress any inegalitarian tendencies. If neuronal interfaces eventually gave rise to a small elite group of privileged persons who flaunted and enjoyed their superiority, disregarding the rest of society, then it is doubtful whether the majority (those not in the elite) would assess the situation positively.14 Moreover, this form of unfairness may be compounded, since the resources devoted to the enhancement of the elite would very likely be diverted from aiding the poor. In order to address this imbalance, society may decide to restrict neuronal interface enhancement, though creating and justifying feasible mechanisms for such restrictions may pose significant challenges. This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.