Page - 129 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

Cyberneuroethics • 129 it may then be an attractive proposition to consider morality as something that can be identified and improved through technology.126 In this respect, it may be appealing to see how moral enhancement may be influenced by direct neuronal interfaces; in other words, how it may be possible for such technology to help make a person ‘a better person’ by enhancing their moral thinking, behaviour and decision-making, while remembering that that any discussion about morality cannot take place without a conception of what is considered rational and good in a specific social environment. However, there may be some significant difficulties with such a proposal. In the first place, moral enhancement cannot simply be reduced to applying constraints to control behaviour because having a genuine moral character is not associated with the use of enhancement technologies that result in par- ticular outcomes. This means that enhancing morality cannot merely mean the use of interventions in the brain.127 In the future, some governments may even consider the possibility of ‘social enhancement’, which can be defined as the use of biomedical tech- nologies for the common good of societies.128 Indeed, it has already been sug- gested that by using neurofeedback or deep brain stimulation (DBS), there may be a possibility of making certain people more empathic, which opens up possibilities for the rehabilitation of certain criminals.129 But this could also be seen as being closer to a form of authoritarian control by the state than a way of making a person more moral in character. Second, those who understand the concepts of virtue, insight and sympa- thy, as well as empathy, and who may know what is right and good are not necessarily the same persons who decide to do good  – for example, they may have a weak will. The difference between knowing the good and doing the good is entirely dependent on free will. Without free will, good cannot be a choice and virtue becomes meaningless.130 But if a person makes it impossible for himself or herself to do what is considered to be bad, questions may then be asked as to whether this can even be seen as a form of moral enhancement; instead, it could just be compared to some kind of mental prison. This means that caution is necessary with respect to any claims for moral enhancement. In other words, it is very unlikely that a better understanding of the biological foundation of human behaviour may enable applications to the brain that may significantly improve the morality of a person.131 Free Will, Moral Responsibility and Cyberspace If a fusion of the human mind of persons with cyberspace is made possible through the development of neuronal interfaces, this may eventually affect their free will and the way in which they are considered to be responsible. This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.