Page - 157 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

Cyberneuroethics • 157 far neuronal interfaces can be used before some aspects of human dignity are undermined. This means that such interfaces may challenge previous notions of human nature and how many human functions can be substituted or even enhanced by technical devices before aspects of humanity are lost.235 But since no definition of a human being exists, it will always be difficult to decide at what point a partially human cyborg may not be a human being. However, what is certain is that devices that enforce unnoticeable per- sonality alteration on human persons without their consent are a threat to their human dignity.236 Furthermore, if such appliances could contribute to the creation of a network of persons who are always connected to each other while being controlled by others, this would be little different to slavery. On the other hand, the human dignity of a person could perhaps be strengthened through his or her ability to connect with many others around the world. Such relationships may then encourage human beings, of all ori- gins, to come closer together by emphasising their shared humanity over any differences of nationality or accidents of geography.237 Thus, not all forms of neuronal interfaces should be seen as undermining dignity. The Human Body: The Human Hard Drive Generally, the way in which society considers and understands the human body helps to shape its understanding of new technologies and their applica- tions. In this regard, the French physician and philosopher Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–51), who was one of the first French materialists of the Enlightenment, suggested in his seminal work L’Homme Machine that not only do human beings exhibit more similarities than differences with the rest of the animal kingdom, but that human beings are nothing but machines made out of flesh and controlled by the same physical mechanics that are found in a clock.238 Thus, the body is nothing but material organised in a very complex and integrated manner. Sometime later, in the nineteenth cen- tury, the human body was then compared to a hydraulic system, with capil- laries, circulatory systems and pumps. At present, with the development of computers and software, it is often compared to a biological computational machine, with the DNA acting as the software. These representations of the human body initiated a number of concep- tual questions in philosophy and anthropology, such as whether it may be possible to enhance humanity without the use of an agreed external reference framework of what it means to be human. Questions also existed between the functional and holistic concepts of humanness, between the external and internal changes as well as between any gradual and radical alterations. In addition, it may be difficult to distinguish between changes primarily related to medicine and those seen as personal preferences, since there may be a This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.