Page - 158 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

158 • Cyborg Mind substantial overlap and ambiguity between the two. This means that every change to the human body must be examined on the basis of ethical theories and principles in order to consider whether it may be seen as acceptable, while considering its potential impact, including its consequences on society. In this regard, in 2005, the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission indicated that: ‘The ethical notion of the inviolability of the human body should not be understood as a barrier against the advancement of science and technology but as a barrier against its possible misuse.’239 As such, it may also be important to consider whether a relevant dif- ference exists when a device is present inside or outside the human body. Indeed, from a psychological and social perspective, human beings consider the human body as the defining boundary and entity of the human person on which many of society’s customs and laws are based. 240 For example, if a mechanical heart is placed inside a person, this could then be seen as an inte- gral part of his or her human body. No one would then be entitled to take it out against the will of the individual. On the other hand, if the same heart was placed outside the body of a person, a different perspective may arise from an ethical, anthropological and legal standpoint.241 This becomes even more complex when neuronal interfaces are consid- ered. As the American theological ethicist Ronald Cole-Turner indicates: ‘We are embodied creatures, and any use of technology that affects any part affects the whole being, including the very core of identity and personality, our mental powers of memory, understanding, and will.’242 Moreover, if a direct neuronal interface was used to fuse a human being’s brain to a computer, enabling him or her to think online, then the element of consciousness within the computer would become an extension of the human being’s own consciousness, which had been enhanced through the interface to the computer. In other words, the person’s own consciousness would be controlling the extended consciousness within the computer so that the person remains human and the computer remains a machine. However, if the consciousness in the computer begins to exist without any input from an external human brain through an interface, the computer con- sciousness could then be considered as a computer person who would be com- pletely different and independent from human life as such. This would mean that the personal psychological identity of an individual, his or her self, could slowly and indistinguishably evolve to become another being through his or her interface with a computer and cyberspace. A clear demarcation line would no longer exist between the computer and the human person. In this respect, Cole-Turner argues that ‘as we turn technology on ourselves so that we change our own bodies and brains, the “I” is swept up in the change and modified through its own action. When these technologies of human enhancement get This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.