Page - 182 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

182 • Cyborg Mind ever more identities into the Collective by violent injection of microscopic machines called nanoprobes. The Borg’s ultimate goal is achieving unemo- tional ‘perfection’, while indicating in its motto that ‘resistance is futile’. A more realistic development of such collectives has been suggested by the Dublin-based ethicists Fiachra O’Brolchain and Bert Gordijn, who explain that with programmes such as the Silent Talk DARPA programme, ‘it is possible to envisage a scenario in which people would collectively partici- pate in a joint emotional/psychological experience’.381 In such a situation, distinguishing the individual and determining personal agency may become challenging.382 Therefore, one important ethical challenge in retaining individual personal agency is making sure that consciousness is maintained, which may itself be limited by the body as the boundary of self. In other words, if consciousness is generated in the brain, a credible theory should be able to account for the way in which individuals experience their bodies as the three dimensional expression of themselves. The bodies of human beings are finite and limited in space, making them specific entities or units. Self-aware individuals are then able to understand that it is possible to transcend their bodies and that others can exist around them. But if human beings begin to be connected in a very intimate way through neuronal interfaces to become part of a greater collective, their specific bodily limits could be breached. The very ability for persons to understand the pos- sibility of transcending their original bodies would then be undermined. This is important since it would also threaten the limits of a person’s sense of individuality. Another significant ethical challenge arising from a possible communion of minds is that this may only be achievable by the inappropriate mistreat- ment or abuse of some minds. In addition, a corresponding risk relating to privacy would exist, including a possible undermining of the protection an individual would expect towards his or her past memories, which would be important if he or she wants to retain a sense of self. Thus, such a commu- nion may result in the loss of individuality, which could even mean a loss of individual personal identity.383 This is something that has already been examined when Greenfield discussed the body of a person, including his or her brain, as ‘the boundary of self’.384 In this manner, a self-aware person with his or her body has, so far, represented the ‘centre’ of his or her free will. But if this ‘centre’ with its boundary of the self is lost, the person ceases to exist. Alternatively, if this ‘centre’ seeks power over others, it may then seek to become the centre of everybody else’s free will. Moreover, if neuronal interfaces do eventually enable minds to be con- nected together to perform certain tasks, then it may be important to deter- mine whether any decisions are an aggregative phenomenon resulting from This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.