Page - 199 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

Cyberneuroethics • 199 167. Erden, ‘Neural Implants’; Soekadar, Haagen and Birbaumer, ‘Brain–Computer Interfaces (BCI)’, 229–52. 168. Philpot et al., ‘Barriers to the Use of Electroconvulsive Therapy in the Elderly’. 169. Reardon, ‘AI-Controlled Brain Implants’. 170. Ibid. 171. Harlow, ‘Recovery from the Passage of an Iron Bar through the Head’. 172. Macmillan, An Odd Kind of Fame. 173. Burns and Swerdlow, ‘Right Orbitofrontal Tumor’. 174. Strand and Kaiser, ‘Report on Ethical Issues’, 4. 175. Ibid., 22. 176. See, for example, Schermer, ‘Ethical Issues in Deep Brain Stimulation’; Schüpbach et al., ‘Neurosurgery in Parkinson Disease’. 177. Schneider et al., ‘Deep Brain Stimulation’; Demetriades, Rickards and Cavanna, ‘Impulse Control Disorders’. 178. Strand and Kaiser, ‘Report on Ethical Issues’, 22. 179. Jotterand and Giordano, ‘Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation’, 476–85. 180. Cheshire, ‘Ethical Implications’, 76. 181. British Medical Association, Boosting Your Brainpower, 25–26. 182. Ibid., 26. 183. Christen and Müller, ‘Effects of Brain Lesions on Moral Agency’. 184. Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis. 185. Cheshire, ‘Ethical Implications of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation for Personal Identity’. 186. Kroger, Identity Development. 187. Miller, What is the Relationship between Identities? 188. Kroger, Identity Development. 189. Foresight Future Identities, Final Project Report, 9–10. 190. For further discussion, see, for example, Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves; Schermer, ‘Ethical Issues in Deep Brain Stimulation’; Foresight Future Identities, Final Project Report, 9–10; de Grazia,Creation Ethics, 70–73. 191. This reflects an ‘animalism’ perspective that was coined by Paul F. Snowdon. See Snowdon, ‘Personal Identity and Brain Transplants’, 109–26. For a discussion, see Olson, ‘An Argument for Animalism’, 318–34. See also Snowdon, Persons, Animals, Ourselves. 192. Even conjoined twins can be considered as distinct if they each experience their own specific identity. 193. Glannon, ‘Identity, Prudential Concern, and Extended Lives’, 269. 194. Mathews, ‘Deep Brain Stimulation’. 195. See, for example, Mackenzie and Stoljar, ‘Introduction’. For a discussion on relational autonomy in the context of respecting the interests of those with dementia, see Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Dementia, para 2.53. 196. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Novel Neurotechnologies, 74. 197. This is not to suggest that memory loss and its effect on self-perception make those with dementia any less deserving of respect as persons. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ previous report on dementia explores these questions, emphasising the importance of making sure that those living with this condition are not stigmatised and that it is possible to live a fulfilling life with dementia. See Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Dementia, 30. See also, for example, National Institute for Health and Care, Dementia, 4; Dworkin, Life’s Dominion, 224–25; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Novel Neurotechnologies, 74. This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.