Page - 221 - in Cyborg Mind - What Brain–Computer and Mind–Cyberspace Interfaces Mean for Cyberneuroethics

Neuronal Interfaces and Policy • 221 cannot be considered as reliable evidence of causation. For example, if a cor- relation is shown to exist between brain structure and political conservatism or liberalism,23 it may be impossible to conclude that certain brain structures cause a particular political disposition. Instead, it may be that certain politi- cal views may cause differences in brain structure or that both political beliefs and brain structure were the result of some other cause.24 It follows that concepts of causality in neuroscience are not always similar to those that are used in law. If it is proposed that an action is the cause of a certain outcome in a court of law, then it must be proved that this result would not have occurred but for the original action. This means that inves- tigations are required to demonstrate any element of causality.25 If these showed, for instance, that an injury changed the brain structure, resulting in a change of behaviour, then it may be possible that a causal link existed. For a person to be guilty of a crime, both an actus reus (a wrongful act) and mens rea (actual criminal intent or at least a gross and wrongful reckless- ness as to the consequences of one’s actions) is required. Thus, if a person is unconscious and, as a result, is incapable of forming criminal intent, he or she cannot have mens rea. Equally, automatism (as in sleepwalking) can be a defence, as can an involuntary action (as in sneezing whilst driving a car). Or again, the state of a person’s mind may be such that he or she may nonethe- less plead diminished responsibility to lessen his or her culpability for his or her actions. In the context of cyberneuroethics, however, the logical end point of such a discussion over responsibility may be difficult to fathom. The role of the law raises questions that are more often implicit than explicit concerning the relationship of law, science and society. Accordingly, legislation may only be seen as effective if it reflects societal values and priorities. Perhaps, this may also mean that there should be a limit beyond which a person should not go in law, a point at which the courts say ‘this far and no further’. Such a perspective is important, for instance, in discerning what the atti- tude of the courts would be if they are ever confronted with the proposition ‘it was not me; it was my neurons’ or ‘it was not me; it was the computer pro- gramme’. It also means that whatever scientific evidence is presented, there may be a legal line over which, on policy grounds, a person should simply not go. Otherwise, no one would ever be guilty of any crime, which may not be considered acceptable to the society in which the law was drafted. How then will cyberneuroethics eventually be reflected in law? In reply, it should perhaps be recognised that because the law tends to develop step by step and, to some extent, is influenced by social values, it may be difficult to see what direction this may take. In addition, any new laws may have some influence on shaping society and for promoting what could be considered as ‘normal’ behaviour in the future. This open access edition has been made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.