Page - 19 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Ballhausplatz and the Deficit of War 19 be forced for domestic reasons to demand the return of the provinces occupied by Aus- tria-Hungary in 1878. This would have resulted in the loss of all investments and stra- tegic aims. Even if this possibility remained mere speculation, it was a key element of Aehrenthal’s political strategy. In his view, it would be advantageous for Austria-Hun- gary to reach an understanding with Russia and to come to an agreement over their interests.15 On 16 September 1908, Aehrenthal and Izvolsky met in the Moravian town of Buchlovice (Buchlov) in a castle owned by Count Leopold Berchtold, Aehrenthal’s successor as Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Russia. There were two reasons for the remoteness of the location chosen for the occasion. On the one hand, it was possible to confer unobserved by other state chancelleries, while on the other, the degree of mutual sympathy between the two foreign ministers was hardly boundless, and it was felt that the meeting should be kept as brief as possible. Alone together in a small salon, the two men agreed within just a few hours that Austria-Hungary could annex Bosnia and Herzegovina while returning the Sanjak to Turkey. In response, the Danube Monarchy agreed to support Russia in its policy regarding the Turkish Straits.16 The hesitation on the part of Tsar Nicholas II to agree to this arrangement and  – far worse  – the foolish ambition and rashness of the Austrian ambassador to Paris Rudolf Count Kheven- hüller-Metsch, who passed on news of the Buchlovice agreement before the agreed date, led to a scandal. Naturally, there were other parties who were also interested in the Turkish Straits issue, particularly Great Britain. London categorically refused to allow Russia to sail its warships through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, having denied it free passage since the Crimean War. Izvolsky then played the matter down and claimed that his aim in Buchlovice had merely been to agree on a possible new meeting of the major European powers similar to that of the Congress of Berlin of 1878. At this meet- ing, Austria-Hungary would have had the opportunity to assert its claims and would have been able to count on support from Russia. Aehrenthal, however, remembered their discussion differently, and regarded Izvolsky’s about-turn as a bare-faced excuse. The fact that the Russians were failing to make progress with their aspirations in the Turkish Straits was ultimately their problem. For his part, Aehrenthal wished to resolve the Bosnia and Sanjak issue entirely in the manner agreed in the Buchlovice meeting. Here, he was supported by the parliaments of Austria and Hungary, as well as by Em- peror Franz Joseph and the heir to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. On 7 Octo- ber 1908, the Emperor proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were to become ‘normal’ provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the future. At this point at the latest, one could take a flight into counterfactual history and ask a series of ‘what if ’ questions. What would have happened if the Turks had demanded the return of the two provinces and, if they were refused, had perhaps waged war against Austria-Hungary ? Would the Austro-Serbian conflict have escalated without the Bos- nian problem ? Would anything have changed in the Russian attitude towards the