Page - 64 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

64 Two Million Men for the War ment, which did not cloak their aggressive tendencies, whilst the ‘decidedly conserv- ative formulations of the Austro-Hungarian-Italian treaty, which warily impeded any change, should contain the seed of the collapse of the alliance’.126 When Italy wanted to take advantage of the Triple Alliance in the 1890s to support its colonial aspirations, Germany and above all Austria-Hungary distanced themselves. The Triple Alliance was no ‘acquisitions company’.127 The resultant loosening of the al- liance led to all three Triple Alliance powers also seeking a realisation of their interests beyond the alliance. The relationship between the Danube Monarchy and Italy was characterised ever more by a palpable distrust, which led to the granting of relatively straightforward concessions to Italy in the framework of the regular renewals of the treaty becoming strained efforts or ceasing completely. This was the case above all in 1902. Following the coordination of its colonial policy with France and Great Brit- ain, Italy focussed its interests on the Balkans. Until that point, Austria-Hungary had aroused with its Balkan policy the interest of only one external power  – aside from the states of the region  – namely Russia. Now, however, there was a new factor in play : Italy. With the Racconigi Bargain of 1909 Italy came to an understanding with the Russian Empire without either Austria-Hungary or Germany learning anything of this excur- sion on the part of their Triple Alliance partner. Italy agreed to support Russia in its policy on the Turkish Straits (similar to what Izvolsky and Aehtenthal had discussed) and received in return the promise that Russia would remain neutral if Italy were to attempt to acquire North African territories. Racconigi was in some ways the comeuppance for Aehrenthal consciously failing in 1908 to inform his Italian counterpart Tommaso Tittoni in good time about the im- pending annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.128 The Russo-Italian agreement, how- ever, was just one more thin thread in the complicated mesh of relations developing in the so-called Concert of Europe. It was almost unavoidable that slights, deceptions and, ultimately, hatred played a role. One should not overrate the tremendous number of treaties, conferences, military conventions etc., for especially in the years between 1902 and 1914 there was a huge inflation in this sector of international relations, which made it almost impossible for the state chancelleries always to clearly work out and to document the applicability of individual regulations. Furthermore, conventions, related agreements, supplementary accords and the like were generally kept secret. The coexistence and the freedom of the Triple Alliance partners to shape their own policies relatively independently of one another led, however, to the agreements being relativised in their value long before the outbreak of war and to a general wary observation of who was conferring with whom and what was being discussed. The fact that Austria-Hungary was the taker for long pe- riods and was worried that the German Empire, but also Italy, would approach another power in the web of relationships over the head of the Habsburg Monarchy, made the