Page - 94 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

94 Bloody Sundays condolences to Emperor Franz Joseph on the death of the heir to the throne, and in so doing had sensed the mood of the monarch, he let it be known that Sarajevo would be made ‘the grounds for settling our score with Serbia’.196 On the issue of how to proceed against Serbia, it was clear from the start that the Habsburg Monarchy would show determination. In light of the messages of support and sympathy from all parts of the Monarchy, it was a safe assumption that the dou- ble murder would not be used to provoke riots. Particular care had to be taken with other foreign powers. Here, attention was paid initially not to potential enemies, but to Austria-Hungary’s most important ally. The first discussions by Berchtold, Conrad, Stürgkh and Tisza already focussed on the German Empire, although the position taken by Berlin was also discussed beyond the framework of the official consultations between the prime ministers and ministers. On 1 July, Berchtold’s chief of staff, Alexander Hoyos, presented his minister with a summary of an interview with the German journalist Victor Naumann, a man with excellent connections to the German Imperial Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, as well as to the permanent secretary in the Foreign Office in Berlin, Gottlieb von Jagow. Several interesting phrases were uttered during the conversation. According to Hoyos’ notes, Naumann had claimed that now, if Kaiser Wilhelm were to be asked in the right way, he would provide Austria-Hungary with every assurance and would ‘this time also hang on until war’, since he appreciated the risks to the monarchist principle. In the Foreign Office in Berlin, he said, nobody would oppose this attitude, since the current moment was held to be right ‘for taking the big decision’.197 It should have been conspicuous that Naumann did not speak specifically of ‘the Balkans’, but of a ‘big decision’. This was an early indication during the July Crisis that Berlin had more in mind than simply providing backing for Austria-Hungary in a war against Serbia. Naumann also added that the full seriousness of the situation must be explained to those responsible for taking decisions in Berlin, and that the conclusions that were being drawn in Vienna must be reported with full clarity. According to Nau- mann, nothing would be achieved in Berlin by ‘tiptoeing about’.198 Alexander Hoyos was an ideal partner for a clarifying discussion with representatives of the German imperial government. He had already been sent to Berlin during the annexation crisis and had at that time brought back the news that the Germans would provide backing. Hoyos also clearly believed that negotiations could be repeated and suggested to Berchtold that he undertake a new mission to Berlin. For the Foreign Minister, this suggestion came at the right moment, since his intention to go to war had been met with disapproval in some quarters. Since on 4 July a Cabinet courier was due to leave for Berlin anyway in order to deliver to the Berlin government an updated memorandum on the Balkan situation and policy, as well as a hand-written letter by Emperor Franz Joseph to the German Kaiser, Hoyos volunteered to travel to Berlin