Page - 99 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The July Crisis 99 against an immediate war : Count Tisza. However, he had now modified his position since 1 July, the day on which he had still warned the Emperor in stark terms against allowing the Ballhausplatz to pursue a targeted pro-war policy. As has been shown in the studies by Norman Stone and F. R. Bridge, a key factor in Tisza’s gradual conversion to the line taken by Berchtold was the result of the Hoyos mission.211 For all other joint ministers, for the Austrian prime minister Stürgkh and for Conrad, it was in any case now no longer a question of if but simply of when they should go to war. Berchtold, for example, referred to the diplomatic successes achieved by the Danube Monarchy in the past in relation to Serbia  – which had come to nothing. ‘A radical solution to the problem that has systematically been created by the Greater Serbian propaganda operating from Belgrade, the corroding effects of which are felt by us all the way through to Zagreb and Zadar, is likely to be possible only through energetic intervention.’ In the view of Count Stürgkh, a situation had now arisen ‘that […] cat- egorically drives us towards a military conflict with Serbia’. Finance Minister Biliński added that : ‘The Serb only understands violence ; a diplomatic success would make no impression in Bosnia, and would rather be damaging than anything else.’ War Minister Baron Krobatin also claimed bluntly : ‘From a military perspective, he must emphasise that it would be more favourable to wage war now than later.’212 When one analyses the record of this Joint Council of Ministers, it is noticeable that the demand for war against Serbia was quite clearly made even before Conrad had presented the informa- tion on military strategy and operations as requested, although this was prohibited from being written down. One other thing is equally clear from the minutes : after Conrad’s presentation, everyone present must have realised that it was highly probable that the conflict would not be limited to Austria and Serbia, but would be a European war. Conrad had three questions to answer. The first was whether it would be feasible to mobilise against Serbia and then later against Russia. The answer was : yes, it would be possible, if full mobilisation were to be implemented no later than on day 5 of the deployment against Serbia. The second question was whether larger troop contingents could be left in Transylvania in order to intimidate Romania. This was an issue that was of particular interest to the Hungarian Prime Minister. Conrad also replied in the affirmative. The third problem was whether it would be possible to take up arms against Russia. In response, Conrad presented his war scenario ‘R’. Months later, Conrad told the acting head of the Imperial Military Chancellery, Major General Marterer, that he had been ‘fully aware of the difficulty of the situation, but as a soldier, he could not ad- vise against going to war.’213 The summary of the Joint Council of Ministers states that : ‘On the grounds of these explanations, a lengthier debate unfolds on power balances and the likely progression of a European war.’ Finally, only Tisza recommended that no overhasty action be taken, and it was he who pushed through the decision that mobili- sation and later a war against Serbia should only be considered if, to quote the minutes