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The July Crisis 99
against an immediate war : Count Tisza. However, he had now modified his position
since 1 July, the day on which he had still warned the Emperor in stark terms against
allowing the Ballhausplatz to pursue a targeted pro-war policy. As has been shown in
the studies by Norman Stone and F. R. Bridge, a key factor in Tisza’s gradual conversion
to the line taken by Berchtold was the result of the Hoyos mission.211 For all other joint
ministers, for the Austrian prime minister Stürgkh and for Conrad, it was in any case
now no longer a question of if but simply of when they should go to war.
Berchtold, for example, referred to the diplomatic successes achieved by the Danube
Monarchy in the past in relation to Serbia – which had come to nothing. ‘A radical
solution to the problem that has systematically been created by the Greater Serbian
propaganda operating from Belgrade, the corroding effects of which are felt by us all
the way through to Zagreb and Zadar, is likely to be possible only through energetic
intervention.’ In the view of Count Stürgkh, a situation had now arisen ‘that […] cat-
egorically drives us towards a military conflict with Serbia’. Finance Minister Biliński
added that : ‘The Serb only understands violence ; a diplomatic success would make no
impression in Bosnia, and would rather be damaging than anything else.’ War Minister
Baron Krobatin also claimed bluntly : ‘From a military perspective, he must emphasise
that it would be more favourable to wage war now than later.’212 When one analyses
the record of this Joint Council of Ministers, it is noticeable that the demand for war
against Serbia was quite clearly made even before Conrad had presented the informa-
tion on military strategy and operations as requested, although this was prohibited from
being written down. One other thing is equally clear from the minutes : after Conrad’s
presentation, everyone present must have realised that it was highly probable that the
conflict would not be limited to Austria and Serbia, but would be a European war.
Conrad had three questions to answer. The first was whether it would be feasible
to mobilise against Serbia and then later against Russia. The answer was : yes, it would
be possible, if full mobilisation were to be implemented no later than on day 5 of the
deployment against Serbia. The second question was whether larger troop contingents
could be left in Transylvania in order to intimidate Romania. This was an issue that
was of particular interest to the Hungarian Prime Minister. Conrad also replied in the
affirmative. The third problem was whether it would be possible to take up arms against
Russia. In response, Conrad presented his war scenario ‘R’. Months later, Conrad told
the acting head of the Imperial Military Chancellery, Major General Marterer, that he
had been ‘fully aware of the difficulty of the situation, but as a soldier, he could not ad-
vise against going to war.’213 The summary of the Joint Council of Ministers states that :
‘On the grounds of these explanations, a lengthier debate unfolds on power balances
and the likely progression of a European war.’ Finally, only Tisza recommended that no
overhasty action be taken, and it was he who pushed through the decision that mobili-
sation and later a war against Serbia should only be considered if, to quote the minutes
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918
- Title
- THE FIRST WORLD WAR
- Subtitle
- and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918
- Author
- Manfried Rauchensteiner
- Publisher
- Böhlau Verlag
- Location
- Wien
- Date
- 2014
- Language
- English
- License
- CC BY-NC-ND 4.0
- ISBN
- 978-3-205-79588-9
- Size
- 17.0 x 24.0 cm
- Pages
- 1192
- Categories
- Geschichte Vor 1918
Table of contents
- 1 On the Eve 11
- 2 Two Million Men for the War 49
- 3 Bloody Sundays 81
- 4 Unleashing the War 117
- 5 ‘Thank God, this is the Great War!’ 157
- 6 Adjusting to a Longer War 197
- 7 The End of the Euphoria 239
- 8 The First Winter of the War 283
- 9 Under Surveillance 317
- 10 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me’ 355
- 11 The Third Front 383
- 12 Factory War and Domestic Front, 1915 413
- 13 Summer Battle and ‘Autumn Swine’ 441
- 14 War Aims and Central Europe 469
- 15 South Tyrol : The End of an Illusion (I) 497
- 16 Lutsk :The End of an Illusion (II) 521
- 17 How is a War Financed ? 555
- 18 The Nameless 583
- 19 The Death of the Old Emperor 607
- 20 Emperor Karl 641
- 21 The Writing on the Wall 657
- 22 The Consequences of the Russian February Revolution 691
- 23 Summer 1917 713
- 24 Kerensky Offensive and Peace Efforts 743
- 25 The Pyrrhic Victory : The Breakthrough Battle of Flitsch-Tolmein 769
- 26 Camps 803
- 27 Peace Feelers in the Shadow of Brest-Litovsk 845
- 28 The Inner Front 869
- 29 The June Battle in Veneto 895
- 30 An Empire Resigns 927
- 31 The Twilight Empire 955
- 32 The War becomes History 983
- Epilogue 1011
- Afterword 1013
- Acknowledgements and Dedication 1019
- Notes 1023
- Selected Printed Sources and Literature 1115
- Index of People and Places 1155