Page - 109 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The July Crisis 109 even supposed to happen ? Ultimately, it would still have to be proven that the ‘Balkan war scenario’, which had been devised in the Operations Division of the Imperial and Royal General Staff in a way that contradicted tried and tested strategies, would be suc- cessful. While since the time of Ludwig von Baden and Prince Eugen, Imperial troops had always pushed through across the Danube to take Belgrade quickly, in ‘war scenario B’, the main forces were to attack from Bosnia and Herzegovina, in other words, from the west, initially through low mountainous terrain, with dense forest and many gorges, that was difficult to surmount. While this may have been designed to achieve the de- sired strategic surprise that is an integral part of all campaign plans, cutting a virtual swathe through the Mačva region, it precluded the rapid seizure of Belgrade. The ‘halt in Belgrade’ was not possible, since the operations plan only provided for the occupa- tion of the Serbian capital after large parts of Serbia had already been taken. In general, however, conclusive decisions regarding operational directions and goals, as well as the numbers of troops to be deployed against Serbia, could only be reached when it became clear whether the war really would remain limited to the Balkans or whether it would also be waged against Russia. If that were to happen, then everything would change. However, this was just one of the dilemmas facing the Imperial and Royal Army. To this was added the fact that mobilisation had not even begun to be put into operation, since the diplomatic activity that would decide whether relations should be broken off and war would be declared had still not yet fully begun. An earlier mobilisation was prohibited for a number of reasons, however, not least due to financial considerations. Following two mobilisations within a very short period of time, the underlying message was : only mobilise when war really is imminent. The Imperial and Royal General Staff has occasionally been accused of completely failing at the start of the war, because while it had always argued the case for pre-emp- tive military measures and vehemently rattled its sabre,242 when the time came it re- quested another 14 days in order to be fully ready for action. However, this criticism overlooks a number of different factors. Conrad was unable to initiate mobilisation measures on his own. While he had spoken to Count Berchtold of striking out imme- diately on 29 June,243 this ultimately held no sway. The decision regarding the war was not a matter for the military. When matters did come to a head, the army needed its time to conscript the reservists, stock up its formations and arrange for the troops to depart for their assigned staging areas, in other words, to mobilise them. Compared to the time still needed in Russia in April 1914 for general mobilisation, the Imperial and Royal Army was much faster.244 However, as it would later become evident, time was not really a decisive factor. The start of the war in 1914 cannot be measured against the standards of 1939, or any other later date. In July 1914, some actively serving soldiers were on leave for the harvest. This may have been a particular feature of the Imperial and Royal Army, although a similar al-