Page - 121 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Franz Joseph I 121 Already during the journey from Ischl to Vienna he had been convinced of the ines- capability of war. During the first days after his return, however, matters of protocol had to be dealt with, as well as keeping foreign countries at bay. The determination to go to war hardened. The Chief of the Military Chancellery, Artur Bolfras, was received by the Monarch on an almost daily basis. On Sunday, 5 July, the Chief of the General Staff was summoned to give a lengthy presentation. The day after, the Foreign Minister and the War Minister, Berchtold and Krobatin, came and both of them were granted 20 minutes to confer with the Emperor and receive his opinion. This was without doubt too short to engage in a detailed evaluation of all aspects of the critical situation. The appointments were, in any case, no longer than the subsequent appointment with the aide-de-camp of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Colonel Bardolff, who reported to the Emperor on the last days and hours of his great-nephew. Everything else was lost in the usual daily business. The heads of the Austrian and the Hungarian Court Chancel- leries, Cabinet Director Baron Schiessl and Section Chief Daruváry, arrived with files and documents to be issued, the Lord Chamberlain Alfred, Prince of Montenuovo and the Emperor’s Adjutant General Count Egon Paar, also received a few minutes each. As usual, no minutes were taken ; the assignments were issued verbally. Again, as usual, everything took place tête-à-tête. During one of the appointments, probably during Count Berchtold’s audience on 30 June or 2 July, the word was uttered that was understood as the monarch’s consent : war ! War was not to be waged at any cost, but the Monarch had resolved to put Serbia in her place. It was not until half a year had passed that Franz Joseph addressed this. Had it been the right decision ? Retrospectively at least, he had his doubts.261 Of course, the Emperor’s vote counted and on 6 July at the latest everything necessary had been said. The next day Franz Joseph boarded his official train and travelled back to Ischl, as though Sarajevo and its consequences had been merely an irritating interruption of his annual summer vacation. This was all the more astounding, given that the session of the Joint Council of Ministers had been scheduled for the same day, 7 July. At this session the basic decision was due to be discussed regarding whether to go to war against Serbia, the consequences such a decision might have and which objectives the Austro-Hungar- ian monarchy should pursue in the event of war. Franz Joseph knew nothing in advance of the diverging opinion of the Hungarian Primer Minister Tisza, as the latter had only been with him for a few minutes on 30 June. Evidently, the Emperor relied on his foreign minister. And while the course was being set for war, the Emperor was sitting in his official train on his way to Ischl. If Austria-Hungary had been a constitutional monarchy, in which the monarch only had a representative function, the absence of the monarch during such a fateful consultation would perhaps not have been so important. But in the Habsburg Monarchy the Emperor had much more than just a representative function and specifically decisions over war and peace were dependent on a ruling by