Page - 125 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Calm before the Storm 125 beginnings of its official independence until the most recent times had been sustained and promoted by My predecessors and Myself, entered already years ago on the path of open hostility towards Austria-Hungary. […] We must call a halt to this unbearable attitude, and put an end to Serbia’s incessant provocations. […] My government has in vain made one final attempt to achieve the objective by peaceful means of inducing Serbia to change its ways by issuing a solemn exhortation. […] Thus, I must proceed to obtain the necessary guarantees by force of arms that will secure for My states inner quiet and lasting peace abroad.’ In conclusion, without reference to the ‘heritage of a glorious past’ proposed by the Foreign Ministry, the Emperor formulated the words : ‘I have faith in Austria-Hungary’s brave armed forces, filled with devoted zeal. And I have faith in the Almighty, that He will grant our arms the victory.’266 Now, we can certainly view this proclamation as the desire to be prepared for the rejection of the ultimatum by Serbia. Even so, none of those who worked on the doc- ument thought the Emperor was wasting his time. The genesis of the proclamation in any case contradicts the common view that the severance of diplomatic relations did not necessarily have to mean war, and it was above all the Emperor who  – according to one of the adjutants in the Emperor’s entourage, Colonel Baron Albert von Margutti  – had said that this did not have to be the result.267 This was one of many retrospective embellishments. The Emperor was absolutely aware of this. He wanted war. A second indication pointed unmistakeably to the certainty of an impending war : on the day of the dispatch of the note of demands, i.e. on 23 July 1914, the senior military commanders began to keep a war diary. This is of interest because with the help of these war diaries we can reconstruct the course of military events in detail already from 23 July. On 25 July, Archduke Friedrich, who had already been placed at the ‘disposal of the Supreme Commander’ several days earlier, was named Commander-in-Chief of the Balkan Armed Forces.268 The powers of the commander-in-chief and his jurisdiction had been likewise fixed several days earlier. They only had to wait for something that could result in a declaration of war. Instead, on 26 July the German ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky passed on another British offer to mediate. It came from King George V and the British gov- ernment.269 They promised to provide compensation for Austria-Hungary at an ambas- sadors’ conference and added that it would not be possible to localise a war. It would become a general war. Serbia would most certainly not submit to Austrian pressure, but undoubtedly to the united will of the powers. Once Austro-Hungarian troops set foot on Serbian territory, however, ‘the world war’ would be ‘unavoidable’, according to Am- bassador Lichnowksy. London thus distanced itself from the idea of a ‘halt in Belgrade’. This option had been discussed between the British ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice Bunsen, and his Russian colleague, Nikolai Shebeko, whereby the Russian ambassador apparently said that the Imperial and Royal troops should feel free to advance some-