Page - 192 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

192 ‘Thank God, this is the Great War!’ still to lead the campaigns in the north and the south. However, Count Berchtold’s heart lay only in the Serbian theatre of war. He had no time for the north.’ Politicians were using the war to pursue the wrong political aims. It was not the events in Serbia that were the decisive factor in terms of Austria-Hungary’s existence or non-existence. It was claimed : ‘This was decided near Lviv’.456 There is much that could be added to this statement. Certainly, with regard to the conduct of Bulgaria and Turkey, as well as that of Romania and Italy, the decisions were not made on the battlefields of Serbia and Poland. This matter was decided in equal measure at the Battle of the Marne, and was therefore far beyond the scope of Austria’s responsibility. The attack on Serbia was desired by Conrad just as much as it was by Berchtold. And neither the military nor the political planners had reckoned with its failure. Conrad’s indecisiveness was however due in part to the fact that he in particular had made deep inroads into the political arena, and it was for this reason that his decisions were not only dictated by what was currently the correct military strategy and what was required in terms of operations. For him, it was equally important what the Emperor, what the two prime ministers, particularly Tisza, what the Foreign Minister and  – in particular  – what his German alliance partner demanded of him for political reasons, as well as those related to the conduct of the war overall. Here, it very quickly became evident that a coalition war tends to progress in accordance with specific rules, and that in such a war, the weaker partner is in a particularly difficult position. The war began as a war on multiple fronts, in which the Central Powers pursued their priorities. The German Empire also saw an emotional enemy in France. Austria-Hun- gary saw the same in Serbia. However, where the two allies could and should have acted in accord in a theatre of war, namely against Russia, there was initially nothing that indicated that the war was being waged jointly. It was, in turn, evident how vague the agreements between the general staffs had been when Conrad let it be known that the Austro-Hungarian armies would advance from the south into the Siedlce region, while on his part anticipating that the Germans would do the same from the north. This would have made it possible to cut off the Russians in Poland and to claim an impressive victory. Yet nothing of the sort could be realised. The Germans did not even attempt to make the strike that Conrad had hoped for. The Austro-Hungarian armies were also too weak to conduct such a massive encirclement operation while at the same time also fending off the Russian armies that were attacking from the east. And yet the beginning looked promising. While the cavalry already fanned out, reconnoitred, provided a screen and was al- ready suffering heavy losses, the last transports of the A Echelon arrived in Galicia. The headquarters moved into their accommodation and began to find their bearings. There was still concern that the Russians would be able to complete their deployment faster than the troops of the Central Powers. However, from 11 August, the level of