Page - 263 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Fleet in Being 263 plans to this effect, which were to have been implemented in conjunction with French naval forces, were already abandoned before the end of 1914. The defensive principle followed by the Imperial and Royal Navy Command and, in particular, by the Commander of the Fleet, Admiral Haus, was subject to criticism not only by the Germans but also within the Austro-Hungarian Army Command. Haus responded, not without some justification, with the remark that the gentlemen may perhaps have an excellent command of the land war, but had no notion of matters relat- ing to naval strategy and operations.628 On the contrary, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy could even claim a success in the land war, since there was no doubt that it was only due to the presence of the fleet in Kotor that Montenegro was kept fully in check on this section of the front. The sceptical attitude towards the defensive concept of the Navy and criticism of its only slight successes persisted, however. Since huge amounts of money had been invested in the Imperial and Royal Navy, and it certainly had the potential to be successful as a fleet, there were many who could not and would not com- prehend why the Navy should be put to such limited use now that the war had begun. The submarines were the only vessels given the task of starting an offensive maritime war. However, in the autumn of 1914, Austria-Hungary only had seven submarines, of which merely five were suitable for use in the sea war. Opinions were also divided when it came to the deployment of the submarines. Haus, who would have gladly sent a submarine into the Strait of Otranto and beyond, was faced with objections from the Commander of the submarine fleet, Lieutenant Commander Baron Franz von Thierry, who was concerned in particular about the low number. Haus made enquiries as to how long the construction of new submarines would take. When he was told that ten months would be required, he replied that by that time, the war would probably already be over.629 The strongest argument that Haus had to hand when defending the fact that opera- tions served solely to protect the coast was that he was uncertain as to the future posi- tion of Italy, and did not wish to expose the fleet to a surprise attack by the Italians. And so the Austro-Hungarian formations bobbed about in the bays of Istria and Dalmatia and sailed the coastal waters. The shock from the sinking of the Zenta ran so deep that even the blockade that had begun off the Montenegrin coast and in particular of the naval station at Bar was called off. However, the following months appeared to vindicate the defensive principle adopted by the Commander of the Fleet. The French succeeded several times in appearing on the Dalmatian coast to deliver provisions to Montenegro by sea, but in so doing, they became increasingly exposed to the Austro-Hungarian naval aviation, torpedo boats and submarines. Finally, they even suffered several damaging losses. Three days after the Curie had been sunk, the U 12 submarine (under Egon Lerch) torpedoed the French dreadnought Jean Bart, the flagship of the French Mediterranean cadre. However, an-