Page - 307 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Death in the Carpathians 307 decreasing. More horses were slaughtered. Ultimately, everything in the fortress dis- trict was requisitioned that could somehow be eaten or used as animal feed. Beet pulp was turned into dried vegetables, whilst horse fat increased the calorie value of human nutrition, even if the tallow spoilt the food. Ultimately, bread comprised 20 per cent birch tree roots. The measure was taken, as the commander noted, ‘in order to at least alleviate to some extent the feeling of hunger among the men, caused by too little food, particularly bread, which is all the more necessary since in addition to their other duties the men must now often carry out the duties of the horses as a result of the slaughtering of the latter’. Every few days new calculations were made for how long the fortress could still be held ; The last calculation revealed that there was enough food for exactly fourteen more days. On 15 March the Army High Command finally gave up Przemyśl for lost. The deployment of the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army with around 150,000 men remained unsuccessful. It foundered, as Conrad wrote, ‘on the tenacity of the enemy, above all, however, on the abnormally adverse weather, deep snow, awful cold (-23 degrees) [and] snowstorms’. From 1 to 15 March, the army had lost 51,000 men. It was assumed that of the more than 10,000 reported missing, the bulk had frozen to death or lay some- where under the snow. At the beginning of March, the Russians began to tighten the circumvallation of Przemyśl and became more active, since they had detailed information about the situ- ation in the fortress as a result of the reports by deserters and from news gathered with the help of a Russophile group within the city. As then became clear, they also knew Kusmanek’s most recent break-out plan. Conrad had advised the fortress commander to break out to the south-east. Kusmanek was given the freedom, however, to decide which direction he should then go in. And he decided in favour of the east. He wanted to break out in the direction of Horodok (Grodeck) and Lviv (Lemberg) because he regarded the chances of reaching the Austrian lines as hopeless. Thus, as much damage as possible should be inflicted on the Russians : blow up bridges and transport links and wreak havoc in the rear areas. The Army High Command agreed. It had no hope what- soever that the break-out could in fact succeed. In this case it was also more psychology that was taken into account than operational planning. Kusmanek could go wherever he wanted ; the most important point was that the end of the huge fortress on the San River was heroic. ‘If the situation on 17.3 indicates that the relief will not be possible in time, then our honour and the glorious conduct of the fortress garrison thus far demand that a break- out attempt is made’, as the Army High Command telegraphed. Shortly thereafter the troops deployed for the break out. It was to take place two days later. The formations needed up to seven hours to reach the lines of the defensive belt, since a fierce snow-