Page - 310 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

310 The First Winter of the War war, since they had already reported such big losses against the Russian superiority. And it could repeatedly be witnessed that German commanders were occasionally able to ‘get more out of’ Imperial and Royal troops when the latter were under their command than Austro-Hungarian officers were capable of. Perhaps this can be explained by a form of ‘manager effect’. The Imperial and Royal troops were induced by German commanders to give their all. They did not want to embarrass themselves, above all not in front of the Germans. This led to them even more willingly risking their lives than they did under Austro-Hungarian commanders. Neither side knew just how disparagingly the other side judged it. Thus, Hindenburg, for example, noted that the Austrians had held out very bravely against the superiority of the Russians, ‘until the [Russian] military came’. The unease about the ally admittedly never really came to the surface ; the resentment remained hidden. It was covered up for the outside world by means of the postcards, coffee mugs, badges, beer jugs and pipe bowls, on which could be read everywhere : ‘Shoulder to shoulder’, ‘We’ll stick together unswervingly’, ‘Let God be with us !’ and similar slogans. Both sides swore ‘blind loyalty’ and ‘allegiance to the ally’ ; poems, rhymes, writings, paintings and sculptures were dedicated to the alliance. In this way, however, two truths emerged : the one, which was more widespread, stated that Ger- many and Austria-Hungary were allies, whose loyalty and willingness to make sacri- fices were beyond all doubt. The other truth, advocated merely by a few knowledgeable people in the inner circle of this alliance, regarded it as an association borne of necessity, which was logical and should remain intact but where the cordialities constituted a crumbling facade. These special problems of the alliance’s conduct of war gave another, additional as- pect to the virulent problem of the removals of commanders, which continued to be practised by the Army High Command : it should be brought home to the Germans that the Army High Command had a mind to ruthlessly dismiss any commander who did not measure up. Whether this made a positive impression on the Germans, however, must be doubted. The effects on the troops were not necessarily positive, either. The removals could demonstrate that the Army High Command was willing to demand their utmost from the senior officers as well ; on the other hand, however, it had be asked what the situation was with the officer corps in general. After the fighting in the Carpathians, the Army High Command dismissed one divisional and two corps com- manders, Generals von Meixner and Letovsky.734 In reference to this, Archduke Frie- drich issued a series of orders, which stated, among other things, that commanders who were lacking in energetic leadership were to be ‘called to account without leniency, re- moved from their command or subjected to legal proceedings’. ‘Those who undermine the spirit of the troops and become a cause of failure through timid talk, faint-hearted attitude, pessimistic character, pusillanimous regret, expressions of desiring peace and a lack of faith should be treated with the same severity.’735