Page - 312 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

312 The First Winter of the War Straub, Chief of the Railway Department in the General Staff, that the German liaison officer attached to the Army High Command, General Cramon, had  – evidently as a purposeful indiscretion  – enquired as to the transport capacity for German troops south of Krákow.740 Conrad concluded from this that Falkenhayn was now prepared to despatch German troops after all. Conrad did not hesitate for a moment, and already in the night of 5/6 April, Conrad’s requests for help reached the German Supreme Army Command. However, it turned out very differently from how Falkenhayn had perhaps intended. The Army High Command assumed that Italy’s entry into the war was imminent and demanded the despatch of seven German divisions for deployment against Italy and a further five in order to keep Romania in check and to prop up the Carpathian front. Falkenhayn now found himself confronted once more by a serious dilemma. He had initially vacillated between a solution in the west and one in the east. A shift in focus to the west was envisaged for spring 1915. The Chief of the German General Staff hoped to defeat the French and the British before the new British divisions established by the British War Minister Lord Kitchener arrived on the Continent. Still, the eastern solution was worth considering. Falkenhayn certainly was not thinking of a southern solution against Italy, however. He obviously suddenly favoured an eastern solution for reasons that cannot be fully explained.741 It may be that the conflict with Hindenburg and Ludendorff played a role. Their attack in Russian Poland had failed at the end of 1914. Falkenhayn could thus only gain prestige in the event of a successful new offen- sive. It was decided on 13 April in the Grand Headquarters in Berlin to allow the Ger- man 11th Army, which was now in the process of being deployed, to attack in the Gorlice area. This was far more than Conrad had requested or even hoped for. For this section of the front, he had considered the despatch of four divisions. Falkenhayn wanted instead to send four army corps, i.e. twice as many. However, he had concealed this from Conrad. The next day, Falkenhayn and Conrad met once again. In spite of the late arrival of the information, Conrad was extremely satisfied that his idea for a deci- sive strike in the east had met with German agreement and that more was to happen than just strengthening the Imperial and Royal 3rd Army in the Carpathians. Conrad also consented to German command over the joint troops, although the number of Austro-Hungarian troops would of course be larger in absolute terms. Ultimately, Falk- enhayn decided not  – as had perhaps been expected of him  – to appoint Hindenburg to command the new army, but instead General August von Mackensen. Colonel Hans von Seeckt was appointed his chief of staff. Falkenhayn furthermore transferred his headquarters to Pszczyna (Pleß) in Silesia and optically devaluated Hindenburg in this way. Now the deployment for one of the mightiest breakthrough battles of the First World War began.